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STUDE NT NOTES AND COMMENTS
EVIDENCE-HUSBAND AND WIFE AS WITNESSES FOR OR AGAINST
EACH OTHER IN KENTUCKY
Kentucky, in common with every other state in this country, has attempted to
govern by statute the giving or prohibiting of testimony by one spouse either for
or against the other. The latest revision by the legislature in 1940 leaves the
present provision reading ils follows:'
"In all actions between husband and wife, or between
either or both of them and another, either or both of them may
testify as other witnesses, except as to confidential communications
between them during marriage, provided, however, that in an action
for absolute divorce or divorce from bed and board, either or both of
them may testify concerning any matter involved in the action, in-
cluding questions of property, and provided farther, that neither may
be compelled to testify for or against the other. "2  (Italics writers).
In order to analyze and evaluate this code section and appreciate its various
ramifications, something more than its bare words should prove helpful. First, an
investigation of the historical background of the present enactment reveals that
the legislature has repeatedly evidenced its dissatisfaction with the law on this
subject by numerous changes. As the statute appeared in the original code in
1851,' it vas first an explicit disqualification of either spouse to testify either for
or against the other during the mnarage. It also made both spouses incompetent
or disqualified' them from testifying during the mamage or afterwards concerning
any confidential coinunication made by one to the other during the marriage.
Although this blanket disqualification of either spouse to testify for or against the
other during marriage in any instance was a manifestation of the general wave
of sentiment throughout the country at that time, it has now been repudiated in
whole or in part in Kentucky and all but perhaps one state of the union.' Another
undesirable element was apparent in the 1851 statute. The incorporation of these
two principles: (1) the general disqualification of either spouse to testify for or
against the other, during marriage, and (2) the disqualification of either to testify
during or after dissolution of the marriage as to any confidential communication
made by one to the other during the mamage, not only in one provision, but in
one sentence has generously contributed to the confusion and uncertainty in our
present law on this subject. The first clause related to the competency of the
proffered witness; the second was concerned not with the competency of the wit-
Ki. CoDs, CIV. PRAC. sec. 606 (1) (1948).
Ibid,
Sec. 670 (4) of the 1851 Edition of the Kentucky Code read as follows: "The
following persons shall be incompetent to testify: 4. Husband and wife,
for or against each other, or concerning any communication made by one to the
other. during the marriage, whether called as a witness while that relation subsisted
or afterwards." This section was quoted verbatim in CODE OF PRAC., CIV. AND CRIar.
C(ASF . STATE O Ki.. sec. 670 (4) (1867).
4The words incompetent and disqualified as used here are synonymous and
nmy le interchanged.
The state referred to is Arkansas. ARK. STAT. ANN. sec. 28-601 (1947) is as
follows. "All persons except those enumerated herein shall be competent to testify
in a civil action. The following persons shall be incompetent to testify:
Third. Htvhand and wife, for or against each other, or concerning any communica-
tion made b one to the other during the marriage, whether called as a witness
while that relation stihsist or afterwards, but either shall be allowed to testify for
the other in regard to any business transacted by the one for the other in the
(apacit) of agent."
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ness, but with the competency of the testimony or evidence which a qualified wit-
ness might offer or refuse to give. These are separate principles, governing
separate aspects of this problem, and should for the sake of clarity and distinction
be stated separately.
This first codification existed in its original form until 1876, when it was
slightly revised. ' It divided the former blanket disqualification into two phases:
(1) disqualification of one spouse to testify for the other, and (2) disqualification
of one spouse to testify against the other. It retained one-half of the original dis-
qualification in that it disabled either spouse to testify to any facts adverse to the
other. A few minor execptions were made to the disqualification of either to
testify for the other. And, of course, in the first sentence it simply restated the
former disqualification of either to testify while the marriage existed or afterwards
concerning any confidential commuications made by one to the other during the
marriage.
No further alteration was made until 1898, when another relatively minor
exception was made in the rule governing the competency of one spouse to testify
for the other.- As it clearly declared, in situations where one spouse was acting
as agent for the other, the statute allowed either to testify as to any matter con-
nected with such an agency.
In 1912 another minor change was made.' The change, in addition to the
exceptions theretofore made, permitted either of the spouses to testify against the
other in an action for divorce where the grounds relied on were as specified in
the statute. These gradual minor relaxations may have indicated a trend, but this
served little at that time to comfort an attorney who was forced to forego the use
of valuable evidence by this groundless gag rule.
One writer, a practicing attorney in Kentucky at that time, made these color-
ful and profound observations on the code provision as it stood in 1917"'
The trend of modern thought is toward changing
that section [606] so that it will read: 'Every person is competent to
testify for himself or another, who is capable of understanding the
facts concermng which his testimony is offered. The exceptions and
SCODES OF PRAc., Ky. sec. 606 (1) (1876) was as follows: "Neither a husband
nor his wife shall testify, even after the cessation of the marriage, concerning an),
communication between them during marriage. Nor shall either of them testify
against the other. Nor shall either of them testify for the other, except in an action
for lost baggage or its value against a common carrier, an innkeeper, or a wrong-
doer, and in such action either or both of them may testify; and, except in actions
which might have been brought by or against the wife, if she had been unmarried,
and in such actions either, but not both, of them may testify."
SCODES OF PRAC., Ky., sec. 606 (1) (1906). Although the code provision of 1876
was rescinded in 1898, it was re-enacted in the exact words as shown in note 6,
supra. with the following clause added: "And except that when a husband or wife
is acting as agent for his or her consort, either of them may testify as to any matter
connected with such an agency."
s CARROLL'S CODES OF PRAC., CIv. AND Civi., Ky. sec. 606 (1) (1919). The fol-
lowing provision was added to the Code as it stood revised in 1898: "And except
in an action for divorce where the grounds relied upon are those provided biy
section 2117 of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, paragraphs 2 and 3, as follows:
'Habitually behaving towards her by the husband, for not less than six months, in
such cruel and inhuman manner as to indicate a settled aversion to her, or to
destroy permanently her peace or happiness. Such cruel beating or injury of the
wife by the husband, as indicates an outrageous temper in him, or probable danger
to her life, or great bodily injury from her remaining with him;' that either or
both of them may in such suit testify."
Note, 6 Ky. L. J. 45 (1917).
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modifications contained in section 606 are unsound in reason and
based on false logic, and not only work hardship, but frequently cause
the miscamage of justice. The truth can be found only by the pre-
sentation of the facts and all the facts. The whole procedure
of our courts is predicated upon the theory that witnesses under oath
detail the facts truthfully. Otherwise, our whole system of juns-
prudence is a hoax. Then why should we make the exceptions con-
tained in section 606?""
" It is only within the memory of persons now living
that parties to issues have been permitted by the law to face a jury
and detail the facts at issue. If it is a sound policy to permit the
party to testify, and this no one now demes, why, may I ask, is it
improper that the husband or wife of the party should testify? That
interest that does not disqualify the party himself from testifying can
by no juggling of logic disqualify the husband or wife of such party,
whose interest is manifestly less personal. Nor can we agree with
the idea that the spouse should be denied the pnvilege of testifying
for the reason 'that it would be strongly calculated to create distrust
and destroy that harmony and conjugal affection so important, not
only to the happiness of themselves and family, but to the interests
of society. ,,
"Those words suggest the days of cluvalry and must have
been written when Kentucky gentlemen all read Sir Walter Scott,
kept their wives secluded in the home, and took over their property
on mamage as a matter of right under the beneficent provisions of
the common law. They may have worked well in the days of
cocerture. But the wife is now an entity, a human being, a citizen.
All the ways of the earth are open to her. She pursues all business
avocations and fills all professions. In a few years she will be ad-
mitted to man s last stronghold and exercise the nght of suffrage.
I submit that no law ought to protect those guilty of wrong by seal-
ing the mouth of the spouse who knows the facts and is willing to
testify. What sort of a public policy is that? Is justice and right
between the parties litigant less sacred than the relation of husband
and wife? Again, submit that no husband nor wife should distrust
the spouse or feel less affection because that spouse has told the truth
that justice might be done. We cannot build our sacred institutions,
we cannot sanctify the home, we cannot inspire or perpetuate affec-
tion between husband and wife by a lie or by the suppression of the
truth. And logic might suggest that permitting the husband or wife
to testify, against the other might be a great restraint against wrong-
doing."'
Id. at 47.
1 1d. at 48.
"Id. at -18 and 49.
KENTucKY LAW JoxmNAL
In 1926, the legislature made the greatest change to that date in the pro-
vision.' But, these changes came in the form of more exceptions to the general
disqualification. An insignificant change occurred in the code provision because
of a relatively mnnor change in the divorce statute. The most important change
permitted either or both spouses to testify in a criminal prosecution of one of the
spouses for bigamy or abandonment. Probably much of the beneficial effect of
the exceptions was lost in the confusion resulting from the voluminous proportions
of the statute.
Between 1926 and 1932 more minor changes were made in section 2117 of
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes. Since this statute was quoted in the code provision,
these minor changes were reflected in the code m 1932."
Then came the revolutionary change of 1940, which is the present code pro-
vision as quoted ,at the beginmng of this note.' A brief resume of its evolution
should prove worthwhile at this point. As hereinbefore stated, it was at its in-
ception (1) a blanket disqualification of either spouse to testify for or against the
other during marriage, ana (2) a disqualification of either spouse to disclose either
during or after dissolution of the marriage any confidential commumcation made
by the other during marriage. In 1876 the first principle was divided into (1)
whether one might testify against the other, and (2) whether one might testify for
the other. The rule governing confidential communications remained unchanged.
'a CARROLL'S CODES OF PRAC., CIV. AND CRIUM., K-., sec. 606 (1) (7th ed. 1927)
reads as follows: "Neither a husband nor his wife shall testify while the marriage
exists or afterwards concerning an) comnicnnation between them (luring marriage.
Nor shall either of them testify against the other. Nor shall either of them testify
for the other, except in an action for lost baggage or its value against a common
carrier, an innkeeper or a wrong-doer, and in such action either or both of them
may testify; and, except in actions which might have been brought by or against
the wife, if she had been unmarried, and in such actions either, but not both, of
them may testify. [And except that when a husband or a wife is acting as agent
for his or her consort, either of them may testify as to any other matter connected
with such an agency.] [And except in an action for divorce where the grounds
relied upon are those provided by section 2117 of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes,
paragraphs 2, 8 and 4 as follows: 'Habitually behaving towards her by the hus-
band, for not less than six months, in such cruel and inhuman manner as to indi-
cate a settled aversion to her or to destroy permanently her peace and happiness:
such cruel beating or injury of the wife by the hlsband, as indicates an outrageous
temper in him, or probable danger to her life, or great bodily injury from her
remaining with him or concealment from the other party of any loathsome disease
existing at the time of the marriage, or contracting such afterwards;' that either
or both of them may in such suit testify. And except where the husband or wife
is charged with commission of crime under chapter 19, page 70 of the Acts of 1922
(Kentucky Statutes, section 33 lil) as follows: 'The parents of any child or children
residing in this Commonwealth who shall leave, desert or abandon said child or
children under the age of sixteen years, leaving said child or children in destitute
or indigent circumstances and without making proper provisions for the board,
clothing, education and proper care of said child or children in a manner suitable
to the condition and station in life of said parent and said child or children, or
any married man who shall leave, desert, or abandon his wife while pregnant by
him, leaving said wife in destitute or indigent circumstances and without making
proper provisions for the board, clothing and proper care of said wife in a manner
suitable to the condition and station in life of said married man and wife shall be
guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by confinement
in the penitentiary for not less than one year or more than five years in the discre-
tion of the court or jury trying the case;' that either or both of them in such prose-
cution may testify. And except that in prosecutions for the crime of bigamy either
the husband or wife may testify against the other."]
'1 KY. CODES ANN. sec. 606 (1) (1938). The change was so slight tha, the writer
deems it does not warrant repetition of the lengthy statute.
'See note 1, supra.
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Between 1876 and 1940 several exceptions were made to the rules regarding the
competency of one spouse to testify either for or against the other. However, the
two principles, slightly weakened by exceptions, remained with the law governing
confidential commumcations until the change of 1940. It is hoped that tis
excursion into the past will aid in understanding the provisions of our present act.
In order to begin an analysis of the present Kentucky Code provision, it may
be helpful to enumerate and clarify the categories into which a proposed witness
may fall. They are as follows:
1. Incompetent or disqualified. A witness in this category cannot testify re-
gardless of his or anyone else s desire.
2. Privileged. Here a witness is competent but not compellable and whether
or not he testifies is contingent on whether the holder of the privilege exercises
it or waives it.
3. Unprivileged. A witness in this category is both competent and compell-
able and a refusal to give the requested evidence amounts to contempt.
Competent authority" states that an incompetency or disqualification 7 cannot
be waived; a privilege may be waived.
The Kentucky Court in interpreting the code provision on this subject has
departed from the orthodox view. It may be questioned whether a true disquali-
fication as expounded by Wigmore ever existed in Kentucky. As stated above,
Wigmore says that a disqualification cannot be waived. Is an incompetent wit-
ness a disqualified witness? In the opimon of the writer, these words may be
used interchangeably without altering the meamng. Before and since the 1940
amendment, the Kentucky Court has said that the failure to object to the com-
petency of a witness was a waiver of the incompetency of the witness to testify."
This is not the preferred view." The incompetency or disqualification of a wit-
ness cannot be waived. As a procedural matter, the writer feels that if an
appellate court finds (1) that the testimony of an incompetent witness has been
received by the trial court, and (2) that the reception of the evidence was pre-
judicial, it should reverse the judgment of the lower court even if there was no
objection to the competency of the incompetent witness. There is a duty on the
court to guard against the testimony of disqualified witnesses in the absence of
objections; otherwise, there would be no distinction between a privilege and a
disqualification.
Now, we are confronted with a paradox. If a disqualification exists in Ken-
tuckT on this subject today, it is as to the competency of the spouses to testify
as to confidential communications made between them during mamage. By the
great weight of modern authority, these confidential commiumcations are privileged
only. Amazing as it may seem, it is submitted that in the end here, Kentucky is
again in accord with the majority. Though the court says the spouses are m-
competent to testify to confidential commumcations,' it is submitted that incom-
petent, as used here, means the same thing to the court as when it was dealing
with the disqualification. The incompetency of* a witness there was waivable.
The net result there was that a disqualification erroneously became a privilege.
Applying the same reasomng, the incompetency here should also be waivable. The
result here then is that a privilege is erroneously called a disqualification yet cor-
112 WIGMORE, EvinENcF sec. 604 (3rd Ed., 1940).
"See note 4, supra
' Hembree v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 333, 275 S. W. 812 (1925). Also see
Jefferson County v. Bischoff, 238 Ky. 176, 178, 37 S. XV 2d 24, 25 (1931); Mullins v.
Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 572, 574, 169 S. W. 2d 611, 612 (1943).
"' See note 16, supra.
'See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 450, 549 42 S. W 2d 689, 693 (1931).
Mullins v. Commonwealth 293 Ky. 572, 574, 169 S. ,V. 2d 611, 612 (1943).
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rectly treated as a privilege. Figuratively speaking, the court has called a spade
a heart, yet treated it as a spade. A brief summary night solve the dilemma of
the reader at tlus point. In practical application, the present statute contains no
disqualification of either spouse as a witness either for or against the other. In
practice a privilege exists as to confidential commumcations made by one spouse
to the other during the marriage. These results are orthodox and generally ac-
cepted. The manner in which they are reached is not recommended.
These views should be examined to determine if they merit retention or to
see if some change is warranted. First, attention should be directed to the pn-
vilege created concermng confidential communications. As a general rule, every
person is under a duty to give testimony upon all the facts inquired of in a court
of justice. An exception to the general rule is established where a privilege against
disclosure of certain information is recogmzed. Wigmore states that four funda-
mental conditions are necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the dis-
closure of commumeations between persons standing in a given relation."' They are:
"(1) The commumeations must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed:
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opimon of
the community ought to be sedulously fostored; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the commumcations must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."'
Wigmore further states that in the privilege for commumcations between husband
and wife, all four conditions are present.' Greerleaf states that tlus principle of
privacy of confidential communication is one which no one is likely ever to propose
to abolish.' With all respect due these distinguished legal writers, their views
still should be reconsidered. All four prerequisites are fulfilled in civil actions
and the privilege should be retained with a few minor exceptions. But in a prose-
cution of one of the spouses for a grave criminal offense, all four conditions are
not satisfied, in the opimon of the writer. Of course, the reasons for retaining the
privilege are those conditions necessary to its establishment. Assume that the
husband murders his mother-in-law. The wife learns of his guilt by a confiden-
tial commuaication. In a prosecution for murder, the husband has his privilege
against self-incrimination. The wife knows that he is the murderer, but she
learned of it by reason of the marital relationship, so the husband can refuse to
allow her to testify as to the confidential communications. If there are no other
witnesses to the crime and circumstantial evidence is insufficient to gain a convic-
tion, the wife, alone, holds, without the ability to transmit, the evidence necessary
to convict him. Is the injury that would inure to the relationship in general by
the disclosure of the commumcations greater than the benefit that would result
from the correct disposal of the litigation? In prosecutions for all odious and
heinous crimes there should be no privilege retained for confidential communica-
tions. The injury that will inure to society by intervention into the marital confi-
dence to ferret out the truth is less than the injury that will follow from permitting
parties who commit grave offenses to go unmolested because of this evidential
gag. Opponents of this view may say that by such a step you would move no
nearer to the solution of the crime because if the criminal knows beforehand that
even though a communication is given in an air of confidence to his spouse, it
218 WicatoE, EVIDENCE sec. 2285 (3rd Ed., 1940).
MIbzd.
ELbzd.
i GREENLEAF, EViDENcE SC. 333c (16th Ed., 1899).
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will not be privileged, he will never give it. Or they may say that regardless of
whether there is a privilege or not, the witness spouse will perjure himself rather
than incriminate the defendant spouse. The answer to both of these arguments
is rather simple. If the criminal has not confided in his spouse, then'no confiden-
tial communication will be divulged, and even though the domain has been in-
vaded, the injury to the relationship will be negligible. As to the second proposi-
tion, a jury will be allowed to determine whether or not the witness spouse is
truthful.
The law does not favor conspiracy. Why foster a marriage which may be
used to protect felons at the expense of society? In criminal cases, this proposed
exception would not be extended to misdemeanors. The maintenance of the air
of confidence between spouses is probably more beneficial to society in general
than would be its benefit from seeing that misdemeanants are punished at the
expense of puncturing the privilege as to confidential communications. Here, the
writer has attempted to state only the general boundaries of this proposed inter-
vention into the marital confidence with reasons therefor. In a model statute
appearing at the conclusion of this note will be found the concise limits of this
proposed intervention.
Another phase of the present Kentucky Statute should be considered. The
statute provides that "In all actions between husband and wife, or between either
or both of them and another, either or both of them may testify as other wit-
nesses provided further, that neither may be compelled to testify for or
against the other."' (Italics writer s). The crux of this whole idea is to encourage
and perpetuate a more healthy marital relationship which is deemed so essential
to our system of society. However, the language of the last clause in the statute
expressly creates a privilege in the witness-spouse to decide whether he or she will
or will not be a witness. This statute has the effect of placing in the hands of the
witness-spouse a metaphorical axe which he or she may use to extort exorbitant
favors from the other spouse by either threatening to testify against or refusing to
testify for the other spouse. Since the enactment of the Married Women s Acts,
the interests of husband and wife are not so identical that either might hesitate
to do so in some intances. The writer doubts that this is conducive to harmony
in the marital relationship.
One solution to this problem might be to simply eliminate the last clause of
the Kentucky Code Provision,' as was done in a model statute proposed by the
American Law Institute.' This would take the privilege away from either spouse
and both could be made to testify as any other witness except as to confidential
communications. Another solution, perhaps less stringent and more widely prac-
ticed, is to place the privilege in the hands of the party-spouse. Tills eliminates
the possibility of blackmail, for then the party-spouse has the option of whether
the witness-spouse may testify or not. This will appear more clearly m the model
statute to be formulated later.
It should be noted that, although no mention is made of such application, in
the code section, the judiciary has decided, with an admitted lack of legislative
authority, that the statute applies equally to criminal as well as to civil actions.'
Legislators generally detest judicial legislation, but have invited it by omitting
the simple insertion of a clause to the effect that the code section applies also to
criminal cases.
Finally, the last defect of our present code provision is that it lumps into one
rather brief provision our whole law govermng testimony of husband and wife.
- Ki. COD S, Civ. PRAc. sec. 606 (1) (1948).
" The words suggested to be eliminated are: " that neither may be com-
pelled to testify for or against the other."
' MODEL CODE OF EVIDEN CF. Rules 214-218, 227 (1942).
-Sce Mullins v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 572, 574, 169 S. V 2d 611, 612 (1943).
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Brevity is commendable in certain instances, but here, confusion results from the
f ilure to state separately and more clearly the law governing the entirely separate
and distinct aspects regarding testimony of husband and wife for or against each
o.her.
In order to better formulate a model state and to exhibit the need for im-
provement of the law on this subject, a brief survey of the statutes of our sister
states should be included.
A survey of the various state statutes reveals that there is little uniformity to
be found in tis country on this subject. Not a single provision approaches the
clarity and progressiveness of a model statute proposed by the American Law
Institute.' True, this statute is rather long, but it is not ambiguous and it leaves
little to conjecture.
The statute govermnig testimony by the spouses in criminal cases ineAlabamae
is almost an exact replica of that in Kentucky. In Arkansas,' as shown before,
there is an absolute disqualification of either to testify for or against the other in-
cluding confidential communications. This is the Common Law view which began
in the 19th century. Arizona has one of the better statutes existing in this country
today on this subject.' - Ten other states have statutes similar to that of Arizona."
At least thirty-seven states have provisions concerning confidential communications
which make them either privileged or disqualify the spouses to testify concerning
them." In application, these states differ as to who shall be the holder of tis
- See note 27, supra.
-OALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, sec. 311 (1940) reads: "The husband and wife may
testify for or against each other in criminal cases, but shall not be compelled to
(to so."
1, See note 5, supra.
32 ARIZ. CODE ANN. sec. 23-103 (3) (1939) reads: "A husband can not le examined
for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband
without" his consent* nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be, without
the consent of the other, examined as to any communications made by one to the
oiier during the marriage; except in an action for divorce or a civil action by one
against the other, or ii a criminal action or proceeding as provided in the Penal
Code or in an action brought by husband or wife against another person for the
alienation of the affections of either husband or wife, or in an action for damages
against another person for adultery committed by either husband or wife."
"See CAL. CODE CIV. PRAc. ANN. sec. 1881 (1946); CAL. PEN. CODE sec. 1322
(1941)- COLO. STAT. ANN. C. 177, sec. 9 (1935); IDAHO CoDE ANN. sec. 16-203 (1932):
MINN. STAT. sec. 595.02 (Henderson 1945); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. sec. 10536 (1935):
NEv. Coan, LAws ANN. sec. 8971 (1929); N. D. Re:v. CODE sec. 31-0102 (1943): OR]
CoNi' LAws ANN. sec. 3-104 (1940); UTAH Con: ANN. tit. 104. sec. 19-3 (1913),
WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 1214 (1931).
31 ARK. STAT. ANN. sec. 28-601 (1947); ARIZ. CODI ANN. sec. 23-103 (1939): C..
CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. sec. 1881 (1946): COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 177, sec. 9 (1935);
GA. CODE ANN. sec. 5785 (1914); IDAHO CODE ANN. sec. 16-203 (1932); ILL,. Rmv. SrAi.
c. 51, sec. 5 (1947); IND. STAT. ANN. sec. 2-1714 (Burns 1933);lowA CODE sec. 622.9
(1946); KAN. GEN. STrAT. ANN. sec. 60-2805 (1935); Ky. CODES CiV. PRAic.
sec. 606 (1) (1948); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 1991 (1939); Mn. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAws art. 35, sec. 4 (1939); MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 233, sec. 20
(1932); MINN. STAT. sec. 595.02 (Henderson 1945); Mto. Rm". SiAr. ANN. Sec.
4081 (1939): MONT. REV. CODES ANN. sec. 10536 (1935); Nrit. Rv. S'iA'r. sec. 25-1201
(1943); NEv'. Corw. LAws ANN. sec. 8971 (1929); N. H. REv. L,%ws c. 392, sec. 29
(1942); N. J. Rav. STAT. sec. 2:97-9 (1937); N. M. STAT. ANN. sec. 20-112 (1941);
N. Y. Civ. PpAc. ACT sec. 349; N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 8-56 (1943); N. D. Riv.
CODE sec. 31-0102 (1943); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. sec. 11494 (1946); OKtA. STAT. tit.
12, sec. 385 (1941): ORE. Coi. LAWS ANN. sec. 3-104 (1940); PA. STAT. tit. 28, sec.
316 (1936); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 537, sec. 15 (1938); S. C. CODE ANN. sec. 692 (1942);
TENN. CODE ANN. sec. 9777 (Williams 1934); TEX. CODE CRIMX. PROC. ANN. art. 711
(1936); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 104, sec. 49-3 (1943); VA. CODE ANN. sec. 6212 (19421;
WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. sec. 1214 (1931); Wis. STAT. sec. 325.18 (1947).
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privilege. One state feels so strongly that one spouse should have a privilege not
to testify against the other in a criminal prosecution that it has inserted a clause
in its constitution to that effect.' Only Illinois' has a statute which closely
resembles that of Kentucky for civil cases. Pennsylvania and North Carolina'
have attempted to exhaust all possibilities on the topic. Other than the agree
ments and oddities mentioned, no other state statute is considered worthy of m-
dividual notice. This brief analysis should demonstrate the need for a general
remodeling of the state statutes on this problem. It is for that reason that a model
statute has been formulated by the writer and is now offered for consideration and
criticism. Considerable portions of the statute proposed in the American Law
Institute Code of Evidence" have been adopted.
MODEL STATUTE-CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Section 1. Civil Actions; General; Husband and Wife; Witnesses for or
Against Each Other; Disqualification Abolished. No spouse shall be incompetent
or disqualified by reason of his or her marital relationship to testify either for or
against the other spouse in a civil action regardless of the parties thereto, not-
withstanding any present statutes to the contrary.
Section 2. Civil Actions; Husband and Wife as Witnesses for or Against
Each Other. Subject to Section 8, below, a spouse cannot refuse to appear and
testify because of the marital relationship when called as a witness either for or
against the other spouse in any civil action.
Section 8. Confidential Communications; Husband and Wife; Privileged.
In a civil action, a spouse, whether or not a party thereto, who communicates a
confidential communication to the other spouse dunng marriage has a privilege
to refuse to disclose and to prevent the other spouse to whom the communication
was made from disclosing such commumcation either during or after dissolution of
the marriage, except in civil cases:
a. For a divorce, separation, or alimony from the other; or
b. For damages for injuries done by one of them to the person or property
of the other, including an action for the wrongful death of the other.
Section 4. Confidential Communications; Privileges; Waiver of. Neither the
offer of the other spouse as a witness for nor the consent to the offering of the
other spouse as a witness against one shall, alone, constitute a waiver of the pri-
vilege granted in Section 3, above. However, the holder of the privilege granted
to the communicator in Section 3 waives such pnvilege if he either:
a. Contracts with anyone not to claim the privilege, or
b. Without coercion and with knowledge of his privilege makes disclosures
of any part of the matter or consents to such a disclosure made by anyone, either
in our out of court.
Comment. Section 1. Civil Actions. At the outset it should be stated that
these proposed rules of evidence are designed for application in civil cases only.
In actual practice today, no disqualification of one spouse as a witness for or
against the other exists in Kentucky or in most states of the union, but a restate-
iiient of this principle in uncontroversial form serves to remove all doubt. Hence if
this portion of the statute alone were adopted it would effect only a slight change
in the law but would inform all of its existence. Thus, this portion of the statute,
although it may appear superfluous, has a purpose in clarification.
, UTAi Coxsr. Art. I, sec. 12 (1895).
SIT,'. Rirv. STAT. c. 51, sec. 5, and c. 38, sec. 734 (1947).
PA. Si.. tit. 19. sec. 683, 684, tit. 28, sec. 316-320 (1936).
N. C. GIA. SvAr. ANx. sec. 8-56, 8-57 (1943).
See note 27, supra.
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Under this proposed rule, marriage is no longer a cause for disqualifying any
witness in any civil action, regardless of its nature or the parties. Privileges (See
Sectipn 3, below) if exercised may limit the testimony a witness may give, but
regardless of the marital relationship of the proffered witness to any party or wit-
ness in the civil action, he or she is never disqualified by reason of such marriage.
If the marital status of the witness be such as might tend to elicit perjury or biased
testimony, the testimony should nevertheless be admitted and submitted to he
jury to weigh along with the other evidence.
Comment. Section 2. Civil Actions. Under this rule, subject to Section 3,
below, spouses would be treated as if no such relationship existed when called
either as a witness for or against each other. A spouse when subpoenaed could not
refuse to appear as a witness either for or against the other. However, the spouse
might at anytime while testifying, invoke the privilege granted in Section 3, below.
In effect, this proposed statute abolishes the privilege of the witness-spouse to
testify or to refuse to testify at his or her election either for or against the party
spouse. The party spouse could call or refuse to call Ins spouse as a witness just
as if no such relationship existed. Most states recogmze one of these principles
at present. Therefore, this section represents a departure from the existing law
in most if not all states. The writer feels, however, that reasomng warrants this
departure. This whole problem resolves itself into a conflict between a desire
to preserve the marital relationship and the struggle to determine the truth in
courts of law through gathering and presenting all pertinent evidence. The aboli-
tion of the privilege to appear or to refuse to appear does not permit interference
with marital confidence. Section 3 still retains the privilege to refuse to disclose
confidential commumeations. The marital status would be jeopardized only
slightly if at all by such. The value to courts in ascertaimng the truth would be
quite helpful in some cases.
Comment. Section 3. Civil Actions. a. General. This section establishes a
privilege not to disclose confidential communications. (For. an apt statement of
the conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege for confidential com-
mumcations, see footnote 21, supra). When these conditions are satisfied, a pn-
vilege arises. This privilege is granted to the communicator-spouse only. No one
else can claim or waive it. This privilege survives the marriage, and in some
states the communicator s personal representative may exercise it after the death
of the communicator. This privilege is retained for a very cogent reason. To per-
mit the invasion of this field of confidence would be to virtually destroy the confi-
dential harmony of a marriage. Its retention inviolate is more valuable to society
than the invasion thereof by courts in search of the truth in civil actions.
b. Exceptions. The proposed exceptions to this rule arise largely from neces-
sity. Two reasons may be assigned for their retention. First, if they could not
testify as to confidential communications in the instances excepted, it would be
difficult if not nnpossible to maintain these actions. Next, in most of the above
actions excepted, the marriage is either being dissolved or else it is in such a state
that it is not worthy of the protection of this privilege. State statutes that do pro-
vide for his privilege vary widely in the exceptions established. The writer con-
siders the above exceptions merit retention.
Comment. Section 4. Civil Actions. Certainly, allpnvileges may be waived.
The American Law Institute Code of Evidence states that there is some objection
to the enforcement of a promise to waive a privilege on the grounds that such is
against public policy. However, the very nature of a privilege implies the pos-
sibility of waiver thereof, otherwise it is not a privilege.
Next, if one with knowledge of the existence of a privilege, voluntarily di-
vulges a portion of a commumcation, he should not be permitted to stop at his
election.
STUDENT NOTES AND COMIMENTS
MODEL STATUTE-CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Secttion 1. Criminal Prosecutions; General; Husband and Wife; Witnesses
for or Against Each Other; Disqualification Abolished. No spouse shall be in-
competent or disqualified by reason of his or her marital relationship to testify
either for or against the other spouse in a cniinal prosecution regardless of the
parties thereto, notwithstanding any present statutes to the contrary.
Section 2. Criminal Prosecutions; Husband and Wife as Witnesses for or
Against each Other. Subject to Section 3, below, a spouse cannot refuse to appear
and testify when called as a witness either for or against the other spouse in a
criminal action.
Section 3. Confidential Communications; Priileged. In a criminal prosecu-
tion of either the husband or wife, a spouse, whether or not the accused, who
commumcates a confidential conununication to the other spouse during marriage
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the other spouse to whom the
communication was made from disclosing such communication either during or
after dissolution of the marriage, except where the crime charged is:
a. A crime against the person or property of the other or of a child of
either, or
b. A crime against the person or property of a third person committed in the
course of committing a crime against the other, or
c. Bigamy or adultery, or
d. Desertion of the other or of a child of either, or
e. A felony either by statute or at the common law.
Section 4. Confidential Communications; Privilege; Waiver of. Neither the
offer of the other spouse as a witness for nor the consent to the offering of the
other spouse as a witness against shall, alone, constitute a waiver of the privilege
granted in Section :3, above. However, the holder of the privilege granted in
Section 3 waives such privilege if he either:
a. Contracts with anvone not to claim the privilege, or
b. Without coercion and with knowledge of his privilege makes disclosure
of any part of the matter or consents to such a disclosure made by anyone, either
in or out of the court.
Comment. Section 1. Criminal Actions. First, it should be pointed out that
this set of rules is designed for criminal cases only. The above rule is inserted
chiefly for clarification purposes. Few states recogmze a disqualification of one
spouse to testify for or against the other today. Hence, its adoption would result
in little change in the law throughout the country. Under this rule, a witness is
never incompetent to testify because of his marital relationship. Whether his or
her testimony is competent may be governed in part by Section 3, below.
Coiment. Section 2. Criminal Actions. As on the civil side this section goes
much further than the present law on this subject. A spouse could be forced to
appear as a witness against the other regardless of objections by the accused.
Generally, today, the proposed itness-spouse has a privilege to testify for or
against the accused as desired or else the accused spouse has a privilege to refuse
to permit the other spouse to testify against him. None of these privileges would
exist under the proposed statute. They would be treated for this purpose as if
no mamage existed. Such privileges often shield persons deserving punishment
and the abolition of such a privilege jeopardizes the marriage very little.
Comment. Section 3. Criminal Actions. a. General. This section establishes
U privilege not to disclose confidential commumcations. The privilege is once
again placed in the hands of the commumcator-spouse. The party who makes
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confidential statements to his or her spouse should be given the pnvilege of deter-
mining whether or not either can divulge such statements. The retention of tils
privilege is considered essential to the maintenance of a healthy confidential air
between the spouses.
b. Exceptions. The privilege does not exist in case of the exceptions enum-
erated. Several states provide for the exceptions enumerated in a and d but those
crimes in b and c are rarely listed. The exception made in e, above, exists no-
where today, so far as this writer can determine. The question of whether societ
will benefit more from the preservation of the mamage inviolate, in general,
rather than in risking placing it in jeopardy through removal of the privilege as
to confidential commumcations arises again. Society will benefit considerably from
the removal therefrom of those who commit the more heinous crimes. It is also
true that the marriage is jeopardized by invading the air of confidence surrounding
it. The writer believes that society will lose less if these criminals are convicted.
If one of the spouses is an arch criminal, society benefits none from the marriage.
However, in so stating, the writer is not unaware that it is not that particular re-
lationship, but marriage in general that society is interested in fostering. Further-
more, much difficulty is encountered in deternming where to draw the line as to
when the privilege does not exist. As stated in the body of the note the privilege
would not be abolished in case of misdemeanors. Perhaps to state that there will
be no privilege in all cases where the crime charged is a felony is too broad, but
it has a certain advantage in that it is definite.
Comment. Section 4. Criminal Actions: All privileges should be and are
waivable, otherwise no privilege exists in a true sense. The reasons for including
the rule on waiver of the privilege in criminal cases are no different from those
assigned in Section 4, Civil Cases.
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